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[So F. Ro. 20649. In Bank. June 4, 1962.] 
FOOTHILL JUNIOR COLLEGE DISTRICT OF SANTA 
CLARA COUNTY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BOARD 
OF SUPERVISORS OF SANTA CLARA COUNTY 
et al., Defendants and Respondents. 
[1] Universities and Colleges-Taxation-Disposition of Surplus. 
-A newly organized junior college district, comprising about 
44 per cent of the area of the county formerly not within any 
junior college district on which the board of supervisors levied 
a tax to pay tuition to junior college districts attended by 
children residing in the county in a nonjunior college area, 
was entitled to a proportionate share (44.43 per cent) of 
the surplus of such tax collected during the district's first 
year and applied on tuition for the prior year by the nonjunior 
college district of which the new junior colle:;e district had 
formerly been It part, since the tax was not a general ad 
valorem tax imposed to meet general obligations of local gov-
ernment, but was a specific t ax levied for a single purpose; 
that single purpose having been satisfied, the taxpayers in the 
new district would receive no benefit from the surplus con-
McK. Dig. References: [1] Universities and Colleges, § 5; [2] 
Universities and Colle;;es, § 10. 
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tributed by them unless that surplus was returned to the 
district. 
[2] Id.-Actions-Parties.-A junior college district is Il. proper 
party plaintiff, as trustee of the school district funds, to 
assert its right to a proportionate share of the surplus of the 
tuition tax collected during the district's first year as an entity 
and applied on tuition for the prior year by the nonjunior 
college district of which the junior college district had for-
merly been a part. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County. Ross A. Carkeet, Judge.- Reversed with direc-
tions. 
Action by a junior college district for declaratory relief 
with respect to surplus tax funds collected by county within 
district during its first year as an entity and applied on 
tuition for the prior year by the nonjunior college district of 
which the junior college district had formerly been a part. 
Summary judgment for defendants reversed with directions. 
Richard H. Perry for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Spencer M. Williams, County Counsel, and Selby Brown, 
Jr., Deputy County Counsel, for Defendants and Respondents. 
DOOLING, J .-This appeal presents the question of the 
rights of the parties with respect to surplus tax funds collected 
in plaintiff district by defendants to pay tuition to certain 
other junior college districts. 
There is no dispute as to the facts. Pursuant to an election, 
plaintiff district was established on July 1, 1957. During the 
school year July 1, 1956, to June 30, 1957, residents in plain-
tiff district sent their children to junior colleges outside of 
the district area. Under the then law, the county in which the 
nonjunior college district area was situated was required to 
impose a special tax on the residents of that area to establish 
a junior college tuition fund. (Ed. Code, §§ 7231, 7232; now 
§§ 2020J., 20202.) This fund was then used to reimburse the 
junior college districts for the full tuition costs of the children 
in attendance from the nonjunior college district areas. The 
tax for the fund was imposed to pay for attendance during 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Universities and Colleges, § 78; Am.Jur., 
. Universities and Colleges, § 31 et seq. 
• AlI8iped by Chairman of Judicial Couneil. 
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the preceding year rather than for the current year, and in 
theory it should yield the amount necessary to defray the 
junior college tuition obligations without producing a surplus. 
Plaintiff district represented approximately 44 per cent of 
the nonjuuior college district area in Santa Clara County. 
For the school year July 1, 1957, to June 30, 1958, residents 
of plaintiff district paid two sets of taxes: one was to support 
plaintiff, a new junior college district, during the first year 
of its operation; the other was its share as formerly a part 
of a nonjunior college district for tuition costs owing to junior 
college districts for the preceding year. After such reimburse-
ment was made for those districts, it was found that there was 
a surplus of $35,793.23. According to past years' practice, 
such surplus would be applied to the next year's tuition costs 
so as to lower the tax rate for the entire nonjunior college 
district area. Of the abo>e-stated surplus 44.43 per cent or 
$15,902.93 was attributable to the area of plaintiff district. 
Plaintiff now as a legal entity seeks a declaration of its right 
to this sum. 1 The trial court ordered a denial of plaintiff's 
motion for a judgment on the pleadings and granted a sum-
mary judgment to defendants. 
The question arises in this way. The governing statute by its 
express terms required the levy of a tax "upon all taxable 
property in the county not situated in any junior college dis-
trict" (Ed. Code, § 7232; Stats. 1955, p. 3369; emphasis added) 
to reimburse other junior college districts for the children in 
attendance in such districts from the nonjunior college areas 
of the county during the preceding year. This statute, and its 
predecessor statute considered in Pasadena Junior College 
Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 216 Cal. 61 [13 P.2d 678], only 
made provision for the levy of such tax on property" not sit-
uated in any junior college district" and thus by its terms 
would exclude a tax on property in a newly formed junior 
college district even though during the preceding year such 
property was not in any junior college district, and but for 
its incorporation into the newly formed district would be 
liable for its proportion of such tax. In view of the obvious 
unfairness of this result, we held in the Pasadena case that 
in conformity' with the "spirit of our laws, which seek to 
'While in its complaint plaintiff asked for affirmative relief in addi-
tion to a declaration of its rights, on this appeal plaintiff has abandoned 
ita claim for other affirmative r elief and asks only for a declaratory 
judgment. (Appellant'9 Reply Brief, p. 4.) 
\ 
\ 
774 FOOTllILL JUNIOR COLLEGE DrST. v. l57 C.2d 
BOARD OF SUPE1{HSORS 
impose upon all property in the state its just proportion of 
taxation," it ,rould be ineqaitable for the area "embraced 
within the newly organized" district not to pay the obliga-
tions incurred during the preccding year for the education 
of its junior coIIege studcnts in other districts (216 Cal., p. 
72), and accordingly issued our writ of mandate in that case 
to compel the levy of such tax ou the property within the 
newly formed district . 
Theoretically such tax should only be suffkicnt to raise the 
exact amount needed to meet the specific obligation. Practi-
caIIy, of course, no such perfection can be expected of any 
human operation subject to the uncertainties inherent in the 
taxing process. The result has been a surplus in the tax funds 
actually coIIected, which normally is carried forward to r educe 
the amount needed to be raised for the same purpose in the 
succeeding year. HO'wever, plaintiff district has no such obli-
gation for the succeeding year and if the C'xcess of $15,902.93 
is used for that purpose, plaintiff's taxpayers will to that 
extent be contributing to the payment of an obligation to 
which they have no legal obligation to contribute. Since, as 
we held in Pasadena, equity required its taxpayers to con-
tribute to the satisfaction of a particular obligation and that 
obligation has now been fully satisfied, plaintiff argues that 
equity equally demands that the excess of its taxpayers' con-
tribution to the fund for that purpose should now be used 
for the benefit of the school district in which it was raised, 
and not for the benefit of the taxpayers of the still nonjunior 
collrge areas of the county for 'which plaintiff's taxpayers no 
longer have allY lrgal responsibility. 
[1] We are persuaded that under the peculiar facts of 
this case this argument is sound. The particular tax in ques-
tion is not a general ad valorem tax imposed to meet the 
general obligations of local gOyernlllent, "'here presumably 
the community as a whole benefits from the governmental 
services supported by the tax collected. (People v. City of 
Palm Springs, 51 Ca1.2d 38, 47-48 [331 P.2d 4].) Rather 
it is a specific tax levied for a single purpose and that single 
purpose having been fully satisfi ed, the taxpa~-ers in plaintiff 
district :will clearly receive no benefit from the surplus con-
tributed by them unless that surplus is returned to plaintiff 
district. Application of the surplus to the benefit of the areas 
in the county still not within a junior college district will 
result ill plaintiff's taxpayers paying an obligation for which 
) 
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they have no legal liability and for which they can receive no 
possible governmental service in return. 
Defendants argue that the Legislaturc has provided specifi-
cally for the distribution of surplus school funds in other 
situations but has made no pro\'ision in the case of any surplus 
in the junior college tuition fund, which would. indicate that 
no such transfer as plaintiff seeks was intended. Thus, when 
a lapsed elementary school district is merged into another 
district, its funds are transferred. (Ed. Code, § 1880.) Where 
there is a school district fund surplus, 80 per ccnt of it may 
be transferred to the county school service fund . (Ed. Code, 
§ 20104.) Any "unnecessary surplus" in the county school 
tuition fund may be transferred to the county school service 
fund. (Ed. Codc, § 20162.) Thcre may be a transfer of funds 
of a school district library to the county library if the former 
becomes a branch. (Ed. Code, § 7202.) 
But the special tax here rests on a different premise en-
tirely. The county superintendent of schools computes the 
total cost of ed.ucation from the preceding year for junior 
college students living in nonjunior college areas. (Ed. Code, 
§ 7231; now § 20201.) That is a fixed and certain amount 
already established, and not, as in most estimates for tax 
purposes, an approximation of future expenditures. From this 
amount the county controller deducts the surplus that is 
currently in the fund, and the remainder is the sum which must 
be raised in the tax levy. He then determines the total assessed 
value of all taxable property on the secured roll and reduces 
this figure by 2 per cent as a delinquency factor. The result 
of this computation is divided into the amount that must be 
raised, and the quotient is the rate of tax to be lcvied. Under 
this method the 2 per ccnt delinquency factor is doubtless a 
reasonable estimate based upon experience, but as a mntter or 
fact the amount raised is never precisely the amount needed. 
and a residual will usually result. (Otis v. Los A.ngeles 
County, 9 Cal.2d 366, 373 [70 P.2d 633] ; Am('l'ican Sec'urit ics 
Co. v. Forward, 220 Cal. 566, 576-577 [32 P.2d 343, 96 A.L.n. 
1268].) Yl't'the statute provides that the special tax is only 
to be "snffieient in amount to d efray" the specified junior 
college tuition cos ~s (Eel. Codr, § 7232; now § 20202) and in 
the ab!>enre of any express method for its calculation, there 
is nothing to indicate that the Legislature even contemplated 
that there would be a surplus so as to be assigned any intent 
as to its disposition. Normally, the surplus from one year 
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would be deducted from the llext year ':; tax, aud the taxpayers 
in the entire area as contilllliug r csitlents of a nonjunior 
collegc district would receiyc the progressive bellefits from 
year to year. But this now is 110t the t:llse here since the tax-
payers of plaintiff district 110 longer qualify for surplus 
moneys retained for the education of j nllior college students 
in areas not within a junior college district, alld allY "tem-
porary inequalities arising from cumulative" levies would 
never "be ironed out and equalized." (A.merican Securities 
Co. v. Forward, supra, 220 Cal., p. 577.) 
The questioll involved in this litigation is one which will 
not recur. In 1959 section 20211 of the Education Code was 
adopted. (Stats. 1959, p. 4761.) This section provides, in 
effect, that the state shall bear a new junior college district's 
obligation to other districts for the cost of educating its junior 
collegc students in the preceding year instead of having, as 
theretofore, the levy of such tuition tax as here was done. 
By such enactment the Legislature has enunciated a policy 
against the double taxation feature previously prevailing in 
the first year of a newly formed jUllior college district's exist-
ence. While the statute applies prospectively, there appears 
to be llO reason why its policy should not, as far as possible, 
have some retrospective force. 
Since plaintiff is only asking for a declaratory judgmellt, 
we are not here concerned with any question of its possible 
remedies to recover the sum involved in view of defendants' 
assertion that the "fund" resulting from the surplus of 
$15,902.93 here in issue has now been expended. Nor are we 
concerned with hypothetical cases illYolving the annexation 
of a portion of one school district to another and other such 
situations suggested by defendants. "'\Ve limit our decision to 
the peculiar facts of this case and hold simply that this 
$15,902.93 which was raiscd by taxation for one specific pur-
pose from the taxpayers of plaintiff district and proved not 
to be needed for that specific purpose, in equity and good 
conscience became the property of the junior college district 
whose specific obligation it w·as raised to meet. 
[2] In view of this conclusion plaintiff district is a proper 
party plaintiff to assert this right as trustee of the school 
district funds .. (Butler v. Compton JUllior College Dist., 77 
Cal.App.2d 719, 729 [176 P.2d 417] ; Pomona City School 
Dist. v. Payne, 9 Cal.App.2d 510, 516 [50 P.2d 822] ; see also 
Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 177,181-182 [302 P.2d 574].) 
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The judgment is reversed with directions to enter judgment 
on the pleadings declaring plaintiff's rights in accordance with 
this opinion. 
Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., and White, J., con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J .-1 dissent. 
Plaintiff does not seek relief on the basis of any right of 
individual taxpayers to recover the surplus in question. They 
have no such right. The tax was valid when levied (Rancho 
Santa .Anita, Inc. v. City of .A1·cad1·a, 20 Cal.2d 319, 324-326 
[125 P.2d 475]), and was not invalidated "hen some tax-
payers receiycd less benefit from the use of the fumls raised 
than other taxpayers. (A.naheim Sugar Co. v. County of 
Omllge, 181 Cal. 212, 217 [183 P. 809] ; see 16 McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporations (3d eel.) § 44.47, pp. 127-128.)1 Thus, 
by organizing a new junior college district (Ed. Code, §§ 2551-
2570), owners of property therein could not make the tax 
invalid or create a right to any of the proceeds thereof on the 
ground that they will not get the benefits of the surplus that 
other taxpayers of Santa Clara County will gct whose prop-
erty is Dot within the Dew district. 
Nor has plaintiff any legal right to the surplus. The tax 
was levied by the COUDty for county purposes and when col-
lected was county property. County property belongs to the 
state, and the legal title is held by the county as trustee for 
the benefit of its residents. (Coullty of Los Angeles v. Graves, 
~10 Cal. 21, 25 [290 P. 444] .) Similarly, school district prop-
erty belongs to the state, and the school district has the same 
powers and respoDsiLilities ,,,ith respect to it that counties 
have with respect to their property. (Hall v. City of Taft, 
47 Cal.2d 177, 181-182 [302 P.2d 574] ; Pass School Dist. v. 
Hollywood etc. DI:8t ., 156 Cal. 416, 418 [105 P. 122, 20 Ann. 
Cas. 87, 26 L .R.A. N.S. 485].) The proceeds of this tax were 
county property when they first came into the county treas-
ury. At DO time has the junior college tuition fund or any 
part thereof been changed from county property to junior-
'The 1957 tax levy raised $714,661.44, and the surplus carried o.er 
from the 1956 tax was $31,445.71. After expenditures of $710,313.93 
for the school year 19;36·1957, tile fund contained a surplus of $35,i93.~2. 
Property owners in phintiff's territory therefore rceei.ed the same 
benefits as other property owners in the county from 95.2 per cent of, 
the fund. As to the remaining 4.8 per cent, those in plaintiff's territory 
are no differently situated from others in tile county "ho deri.ed no 
direct benefit from the junior college tuition fund or a part thereof. 
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college-district property. The county is still trustee of this 
fund, and plaintiff has no IC'gal claim thereto. What plaintiff 
is seeking is a transfer of funds from the county as trustee 
to it as trn.stee on the ground that a part of the surplus ,vas 
acquired from property owners within its boundaries and 
although such owncrs have no right to rccover the surplus they 
should get it indirectly through the r eduction in their taxes 
for the support of plaintiff that could result from its acqui-
sition of part of the surplus. 
Such transfers can be made if authorized by statute. Thus, 
the holding in Pass School Dist. v. Hollywood Dist ., supra, 
that when a new school district is carved out of an old one, 
title to property located in the new district is transferreu 
to it, was based on a statutory provision vesting in school 
districts management and control of school property located 
within their boundaries. (P. 418.) The court noted that "in 
the absence of such provision, the rule of the common law 
obtains, and that rule leaves the property where it is found . 
... " (P. 419; Hughes v. Ewing, 93 Cal. 414,417-418 [28 P. 
1067].) This rule applies here, for there is no statutory pro-
vision for the transfer of these funds from the county to 
plaintiff. Not only is there no provision for such a transfer, 
but the statutes expressly direct the use to which the funds 
are to be put and the manner in which they are to be admin-
istered. (Ed. Code, §§ 20204-20208.) The county has adhered 
to these statutory directions, as it was obliged to do, and has 
expended the surplus in question for the junior college educa-
tion of its residents in the school yCa!· 1957-1958. Education 
Code section 20201 specifies the educational expenses to be 
paid from the junior college tuition fund, and section 20202 
authorizes the board of supervisors to levy a tax" sufficient in 
amount to defray all amounts specified in subdivisions (a), 
(b), and (c) of section 20201." There is no authority for a 
tax levy to pay this judgment or any other costs from the 
junior college tuition fund that are not specified in section 
20201 . • Payment of the judgment out of the county's general 
fund, ,,·hich is raised by taxes levied on all property in the 
county, would defeat the purpose of the judgment, for it 
would require property owners in plaintiff's territory to pay 
nearly half the judgment themselves even though it is in-
tended for their benefit against other property owners in the 
county_ 
Pasadena Junior Oollege Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 216 
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Cal. 61 [13 P.2d 678], on which plaintiff relies, does not sup-
port its contention that it has an equitable right to rccover 
the smplus indepcndent of any statute on the ground that the 
surplus was created by a tax levy not authorized by statute 
but re!]uired only by equitable principles. That case involved 
the construction of Education Code section 7232 (now 
§ 20202) exempting from taxation for the junior college tui-
tion fund property " situated in any junior college district." 
That phrase was held to r efer to the time at which the expenses 
payable from the junior college tuition fund were incurred 
rather than the time at which the tax therefor was levied. It 
is true that the court chose the more equitable interpretation 
of this language, but there can be no doubt that it was the 
statutc and not equitable principles independent thereof that 
compelled the result in that case. 
The Legislature is aware of the problem of allocating sur-
plus tax funds such as those in issue here. Education Code 
sections 20151 through 20162, for example, provide for the 
county school tuition fund to pay the expenses of California 
students attending school in adjoining states. This fund, like 
the junior college tuition fund, is created by a special ad 
valorem tax levied in one year to pay the costs incurred in 
the previous year. Section 20162 directs the county super-
intendent of school;;, with the approval of the county auditor, 
to "transfer any unneces3ary surplus in the county school 
tuition fund to the county school service fund [see Ed. Code, 
§§ 20101-20109] whenenr in his judgment the surplus will 
not be needed for the payment of tuition." There is no similar 
provision for the transfer of a surplus in the junior college 
tuition fund. Moreover, in 1959 the Legislature added section 
20211 to the provisions of the Education Code relating to the 
junior college tuition fund. That section eliminated the pro-
cedure under which owners of property in a new junior college 
district "'ould be taxed twice during the first year of the 
district's existence- once by the district and once by the 
county for the prior year's expenses payable from the junior 
college tuition fund. The Legislature did not provide, how-
evcr, for the apportionment of that fund or any surplus 
therein between the counly and a new district. Inasmuch as 
the contribution to be made by the state under this section 
is to bc "the difference between the amoullt which would have 
been raised [in the new district] in such year if a special tax 
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had been levied in such territory pursuant to Section 20202, 
and the amount which actually was or will be raised in such 
year from the levy of the special tax required by this para-
graph," a surplus, attributable in part to the state, in part to 
property owners in the new district (if the junior-college-
tuition-fund tax rate exceeds that of the district), and in part 
to other property owners in the county, is as likely to arise 
in the future as in the past, for delinquencies can never be 
estimated exactly.2 By providing for apportionment of any 
such surplus the Legislature could have reduced substan-
tially the state's contribution to the fund. It is significant 
that, having made provision for disposition of like surpluses 
in similar funds, and having had this problem before it in 
1959, the Legislature did not provide for such apportionment. 
"It is not our province to weigh the desirability of the social 
or economic policy underlying the statute or to question its 
wisdom; they are purely legislative matters." (Allied Prop-
erties v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 53 Ca1.2d 
141, 146 [346 P.2d 737].) 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied June 27, 
1962. Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
'For example, assume that the county levies a junior-college-tuition-
fund tax of one cent per $100 a.ssesscd property valuation, that the new 
district levies a district tax of one-half cent per $100 assessed property 
.aluation, that the total assessed mlue of all property in the county is 
~100,000,000, and that half of it is in the new district. Under the old 
procedure property owners in the new district would pay both taxes in 
full, or a total of $7,500, $5,000 of which would be paid to the county 
and $2,500 to the district. Other property owners in the county would 
pay only the county tax, or a total of $5,000 to the county. Under the 
new procedure property owners in the new district would pay a total 
of $5,000 of which $2,500 would be paid to the county and $2,500 to 
the district. The state would make up the difference between what they 
paid to the county and what they would have paid to the county under 
the old procedure, or $2,500. A surplus is as likely to arise from an 
over-estimate of delinquencies under either procedure. If, for example, 
the surplus were $1,000, under the new procedure $250 would be at-
tributable to the state, ~250 to the property owners in the new district, 
and $.300 to other property owners in the county. Under the majority 
opinion the state as well as the new district would be entitled to $250 . 
Had the Legislature intended any such disposition of the surplus it 
would have so provided. 
